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Towards a Theory of Responsible Investing:
On the Economic Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility
ABSTRACT 
Studies that link corporate social and financial performance usually find a positive association 
between the two. However, the literature does not establish a significant impact of socially 
responsible investing on stock market returns. We develop a coherent economic framework of 
responsible investing to address this paradox. The framework offers theoretical underpinnings for 
all research on responsible investment as it provides the theoretical underpinnings for the actual 
behavior of market participants. We associate corporate social performance with key financial 
accounting ratios like the market-to-book ratio (market value of the firm in relation to accounting 
value), return on assets, and stock market return. We conclude that there is a strong theoretical 
foundation for a positive relationship between corporate social responsibility and financial 
performance, though the relation is conditional on which financial performance measure is 
considered. We illustrate that the empirical literature about responsible investing is well in line
with our model’s propositions. 
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1 Introduction
Margolis and Walsh (2001, 2003) provide a thorough review of the literature connecting corporate social 
performance with financial performance. Based on more than 100 studies, they conclude that there is a 
positive association between social and financial performance and little evidence of a negative association 
(see also Orlitzky et al., 2003). In contrast, the literature about stock market returns in relation to corporate 
social responsibility does arrive at a somewhat different conclusion: Many researchers (e.g. Bauer et al., 
2005; Bello, 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008) find that socially responsible investments yield returns that are 
not significantly different from those on conventional investments. Others (e.g. Gezcy et al., 2003; Hong & 
Kacperzcyk, 2009) even find that socially responsible stocks are overpriced. Thus, it appears that there is a 
paradox: Social performance of firms seems to be valued differently, depending upon the perspective 
taken, which is the supply-side or the demand-side of social responsibility. 
In this paper, we provide a coherent theoretical framework for responsible investing. We build on 
a coherent economic framework from which we can logically derive propositions about the relationship 
between social and financial performance. We come up with a model that  is based on the models of 
Heinkel et al. (2001) and Mackey et al. (2007). We integrate two of the model’s extensions as suggested by 
Mackey et al. (2007), namely that firms vary in their responsible performance and that investor preferences 
are heterogeneous. As such, we explicitly link the supply and demand side for corporate social 
responsibility. Furthermore, we explore specifically what the consequences are of the choice of firms to 
meet investor’s demand for corporate socially responsible behavior on three popular financial ratios.
The key ingredients of our model are that socially responsible investors take account of external 
effects of production, which we label “social damage”,  and as a consequence accept a lower financial 
return on a responsible stock compared to an irresponsible stock. The way we model this is by endowing 
consumers with a preference for “more responsible” firms. Formally, consumers receive a warm-glow, as 
in the seminal paper by Andreoni (1990), if they own shares of firms that produce more responsibly (i.e. 
their production is to be associated with less social damage). So in a way, consumers are purely egoistic in 
the setting; they do not actually care whether, for example, the firm pollutes or not, as they do not value the 
environment directly. They only care if they have shares of the firms that pollute. We do not consider 
where the preferences for socially responsible production come from; in this paper we are only interested 
in the consequences for firms’ financial performance due to the demand for socially responsible
production. To be clear, in the narrative of the paper, we often refer to ``pollution’’ as the unwanted side-
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effect of production, but we do not model the standard external effect of pollution. The model’s assumption 
that firms generate social damage as a byproduct also suits problems such as child-labor or poor health and 
safety standards in working conditions. For these two examples it is perhaps even more clear that 
consumers are not directly affected by variation in the standards of production. Hence, it is important to 
realize that we do not consider the standard (environmental) externality framework in this paper but only 
the warm glow effect. Furthermore, regarding the supply side of the economy, socially responsible 
entrepreneurs may meet the interest in the demand for socially responsible production. This results in less 
input of capital and a higher return on assets because of decreasing marginal returns to production. The 
implication from the demand side assumption is that responsible firms are characterized by higher market-
to-book ratios than irresponsible firms. The implication from the supply side assumption is that more 
responsible firms are characterized by a higher return on assets. Combining the two in the equilibrium 
situation regarding stock market returns shows that the overall effect is conditional on the parameters of the 
model: stock market returns can both be higher or lower for responsible firms compared to those of 
irresponsible firms. Intuitively, this ultimately depends upon the relative strength of how much investors 
and firms respectively value the internalization of irresponsibility or social damage. 
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews socially 
responsible investing. Section 3 discusses the models from which we derive our propositions regarding the 
relationship between social and financial performance. Section 4 discusses the propositions of our model. 
Section 5 is an illustration of our model as it reorganizes the literature covered by Margolis and Walsh 
(2001, 2003) by linking this literature to the propositions. Section 6 concludes.
2. Socially responsible investing
The most common definition of socially responsible investment is: “[…] ethical investments, 
responsible investments, sustainable investments, and any other investment process that combines 
investors’ financial objectives with their concerns about environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues” (Eurosif 2008, page 6). Different authors and organizations use heterogeneous vocabulary when 
referring to investments that are motivated by concerns beyond the strictly financial ones (see Sandberg et 
al. 2009). In this article, we will use the term SRI to cover investments that take into account 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors. 
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What may be the impact on firm behavior because of socially responsible investing? Johnsen 
(2003) argues that the size of socially responsible investment funds usually is much too small for the 
fund’s portfolio decisions to have an impact on firm behavior. Therefore, Johnsen argues, socially 
responsible funds should become active owners. However, the prospects of this policy are limited too. 
First, there are institutional and legal constraints, as in many countries mutual funds have to face 
restrictions for the ownership of a substantial part of corporations. Second is that the share of co-operating 
socially responsible investors would have to be quite substantial. Heinkel et al. (2001) show that 
exclusionary ethical investing leads to polluting firms being held by fewer investors since green investors 
eschew polluting firms' stock. This lack of risk sharing among non-green investors leads to lower stock 
prices for polluting firms, thus raising their cost of capital. If the higher cost of capital more than 
overcomes the cost of reforming (i.e. a polluting firm cleaning up its activities), then polluting firms will 
become socially responsible because of exclusionary ethical investing. A key determinant of the incentive 
for polluting firms to reform is the fraction of funds controlled by green investors. In their model, Heinkel 
et al. find that at least 20% green investors are required to induce any polluting firms to reform. Third, 
shareholder activism is seen as a factor that might impact on the direction of the business strategy. It 
consists of various elements: proxy voting, resolutions, and dialogue. Shareholder activism is a process by 
which the shareholders of a listed company, under the provisioning of securities legislation in various 
jurisdictions, can request their members to meet and vote on specific resolutions. However, the major 
problem with shareholder activism is that we do not have systematic surveys of the de facto impact of these 
efforts on firms’ policies and performance (see Bauer et al., 2010). The evidence so far is rather anecdotal. 
Given the nature of the process, it also is very difficult to empirically verify whether shareholder activism 
has an impact at all.
Evaluating corporate governance, environmental, social, and economic factors allows investors to 
manage their funds in a way that is consistent with the investor’s mission and values. The investor can 
make a trade-off between the performance and policies of the firm with respect to these factors and its 
financial performance (i.e. risk and return). Different studies of socially responsible investing suggest that 
ethical screening of companies is likely to affect the characteristics of the assets included in the portfolio. 
As such, screening for social responsibility might impact on the portfolio, in particular on portfolio 
diversification and portfolio performance (see Grossman and Sharpe, 1986; Diltz, 1995; Galema et al., 
2008; Renneboog et al., 2008). Skipping funds from the list of investable objects reduces the investment 
universe from which the investors can make a choice. As such, screening reduces the scope for optimizing 
the trade-offs between financial risk and return. Several empirical studies of the financial performance of 
socially responsible investment funds have appeared in the recent past (for a critical review see Capelle-
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Blancard and Monjon, 2012). The general findings of these studies are that there is not a significant 
difference in the returns on the socially responsible investment funds compared to those of conventional 
funds. Financial risk also is of the same order of magnitude for the two types. Therefore, screening does 
not seem to have a significant impact on the risk and return characteristics of the two types of investing. 
Also, and relatedly, stock market indices that are made up of firms that are included in socially responsible 
investment funds do correlate highly with indices that are composed of conventional funds (Statman, 
2005). So, it appears that socially responsible investors do not forego a lot of opportunities, but they also 
do not financially benefit from their screening activities. 
The linkages between finance and sustainability or responsibility that are being investigated center 
on the role of shareholders. While shares and shareholder rights indeed can be an important instrument to 
impact upon the direction of the firm, they are not the only means. Private capital and bank credit are very 
important financial instruments too if it comes to providing external finance to the firm. However, these 
types of financing are much more opaque than financing via the market for stocks or bonds (see Boot and 
Thakor, 1997). Nevertheless, their impact is at least of equivalent importance. The channel through which 
the impact of the financier is transmitted, however, is quite different from that of the stock market, where 
we have shareholders with ownership and dividend rights. Especially, banks’ screening and monitoring of 
projects and firms may affect the social responsible behavior and performance of the firm. As such, it will 
impact upon the actual operations of the firm that is being financed. Assessing non-financial attributes of 
firms is a very common way to do business by banks and other financial institutions. They often regard 
qualitative attributes of the firm and the entrepreneurs as proxies for the viability of their project or firm 
(Saunders and Allen, 2002). They select firms and projects on the basis of their performance with respect 
to such non-financial characteristics. As such, the screening of firms is a very important instrument for 
financial intermediaries to direct their funds. The screening literally gives direction to the way in which the 
funds are being put to use. This is because the financial intermediary as a lender not only provides finance, 
but also is involved in project design, monitoring, and implementation (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). 
Another issue is that in analyzing the connection between social and financial performance, it is 
implicitly assumed that financial performance measures can be used interchangeably (Margolis and Walsh, 
2001 &, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). This would indeed be the case without the existence of unwanted
side-effects in production. In an imperfect environment, prices will not reflect all relevant economic 
information. Therefore, we explicitly ask what would be the economic impact of social responsibility. It 
appears that the taking into account the demand for socially responsible production will have a negative 
effect on accounting profits (see also Gregory et al., 2014). Lower profits will have a negative effect on the 
stock market value. However, if the mitigation of unwanted side effects is valued by socially responsible 
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stockholders, there also is a positive effect on the stock market value from this internalization. 
Consequently, accounting profit and stock price need not change in the same way. Furthermore, partial 
equilibrium analysis cannot reveal the overall impact of the two opposing effects. Therefore, we need an 
economic model that links socially responsible investment and corporate social responsibility in a more
general theoretical framework. Our model illustrates that in case non-monetary effects of production are 
internalized, different financial performance measures capture different economic effects.
To this extent, we depart from the work done by Merton (1987), Heinkel et al. (2001), and Mackey 
et al. (2007). Mackey et al. (2007) present a simple stock market model in which a fraction of the 
consumers is socially conscious. This model is in line with the “green screening” model of Heinkel et al. 
(2001) and the “incomplete information” model of Merton (1987), in which there is a similar distinction 
between two groups of investors. However, in the model of Mackey et al. (2007), utility is linear and there 
is no uncertainty, in contrast to Heinkel et al. (2001) and Merton (1987). The starting point of our model is 
quite similar to these three approaches. We also present a stock market model with socially responsible 
investors and uncertainty so that stock value is affected by corporate social responsibility. However, we are 
able to generalize these models in a number of ways. First, as suggested by Mackey et al. (2007), we allow 
for heterogeneity among investors with respect to their attitude towards social responsibility. Second, we 
also let firms vary in their ability to make socially responsible investments. Third, we specifically model 
how the choice of the firm to behave either socially responsible or socially irresponsible affects financial 
performance in equilibrium. The choice to behave socially responsible or not is exogenous to our model, 
but by considering both cases we can compare the outcomes of the decisions. As such, we do not only 
model the demand for social responsibility (through socially responsible investment) but also the supply of 
corporate social responsibility. Finally, our analysis does not focus on a single financial performance 
measure, which usually is stock market value in most of the literature above, but we discuss the 
implications for three different classes of commonly used financial performance measures. The key result 
is that by considering external effects in equilibrium, the classes of financial performance measures need 
no longer have the same interpretation. This offers a solution to the seemingly paradoxical empirical 
findings in the social and financial performance literature and those on socially responsible investing and 
financial performance. 
Next, we develop a model that links SRI and CSR in a more general economic equilibrium 
framework. This model shows that in case externalities are made internal to household (i.e. firms, 
lenders/investors) decisions, different financial performance measures capture different economic effects. 
Then, we use the model’s propositions to assess the empirical literature about the link between corporate 
social and financial performance.
Page 7 of 42
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
6
3. Model
The basic set-up of our model is in line with the stock market model of Diamond (1967). 
However, we add an externality in production, namely social damage, as defined in the introduction of this 
study. This damage can relate to environmental pollution, social harm, breaches of trust, etc. We define 
consumer preferences over these social damages.
Production technology and financing structure
We consider n  firms. We assume that the production )( ii kf  by firm i is Cobb-Douglas with 
parameter 0 < αi <1 and a function of capital intensity ik , 
.)( iiii kkf
 (1)
Firm i also generates an economic “bad”, labeled social damage iD , which we may think of as 
environmental pollution. For simplicity, but without losing the general argument, we assume it is 
proportional to )(f : 
).(= ii kfD ii  (2)
Note that iD  is total social damage and i  is social damage proportional to production. This way 
social damage will be proportional to both total output and capital intensity, which is a common 
assumption (see e.g. Dam, 2011). We assume that each firm produces the same good and the same bad.
We assume that the firm finances the production factors by issuing bonds at a risk-free rate r. We 
can thus use the capital stock and total debt of the firm interchangeably. This may seem a very restrictive 
way to finance real investments, but as we will show later, the value of the firm will only depend on output 
and not on the financing structure. Since the firm uses all the funds raised via bonds to buy capital ki, this 
amount is also equal to the book value of the firm and the value of outstanding shareholdings is equal to 
zero as long as capital is not employed in production. However, we assume that as soon as bonds are issued
to buy capital, investment opportunities arise in the form of the production technology. These opportunities
create potential (uncertain) profits by employing capital in production, which may increase the value of the 
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outstanding shares. Via this simple mechanism we provide the potential for a difference between market 
values and (historical) book values in a static model.
Profits, Ri, for the shareholders of firm i are given by: 
.)()(= iiiii rkkfgR  (3)
where )(ig  is the price at which output is sold. Uncertain demand for output is reflected by a random 
vector  .  Consequently, only the price for the output, )(ig , depends on demand shocks, so that output 
and damage do not depend on the state of nature  . We assume )(1,N~)( 2iig   and we consider the 
simple case where covariances between the )(ig 's equal zero. The effects of covariances on prices and 
portfolio selection are well known. Generally, covariances play an important role in asset pricing, but for 
our purpose we only require a risk premium since we focus on the effect of social preferences on asset 
prices. Incorporating covariances between the demand shocks would yield higher systematic risk, but 
qualitatively they do not influence the pricing equations (see Cochrane, 2001).
Expected profits and the variance of profits are: 
,)(=][= iiiii rkkfRE  (4)
.)(=][= 222 iiiiiR kfRVar  (5)
Consumer preferences
There are m  consumers and consumer j  has individual preferences for the good and the bad 
which are represented by a consumer-specific utility function ),( jj
j dcU , which we assume to exhibit 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA):
(6)
where jc  is consumption, λi is the subjective marginal rate of substitution between social damage and 
consumption, and jd  is an index of the social damage caused by firms the consumer holds shares in. The 
social preferences are modeled in line with Dam (2011) and Dam and Heijdra (2011): The consumers 
experience a “warm glow” from not contributing to total social damages, as argued in Andreoni (1990). 
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Therefore, we model social responsible investment by assuming that the consumer feels responsible for a 
part of the social damage produced by the firms in which she holds shares, and does so simply relative to 
the total share-weighted damage levels implied by her portfolio of assets, i.e.:
,=
1=
iDd ij
n
i
j 
where ij  is the number of shares consumer j  holds in firm i . Furthermore, we assume that consumers 
want to maximize their expected utility: 
)].,([= jj
jj dcUEV (7)
As equation (6) shows, we assume all consumers exhibit the same level of absolute risk aversion,
=
][
][
j
cUE
j
ccUE , for all j. However, they differ in their social preferences, jj
cUE
j
dUE =
][
][ , where λj is the 
implicit subjective conversion price, or the subjective marginal rate of substitution, of social damage to 
consumer j ’s consumption. If λj =0, the consumer does not care about social damage at all. 
Demand: Portfolio selection
Consumer j has initial wealth Wj, which consists of initial shareholdings and production factors.
Assets are indexed by ni 1,...,=  and generate payoffs iR  and damage iD . The consumers receive these 
cash and social damage flows in proportion to their shareholdings in firm i . Asset i  can be bought at price 
ip . Consumers can also buy bonds and the price of a bond is used as the numeraire. One unit of a bond is 
a commitment to pay a fixed amount of r  units of consumption. As such, this asset is risk-free and non-
polluting. Let jb  be the total amount of bonds of consumer j . Then, an investor chooses a portfolio to 
maximize expected utility:
)],([max jj
j
ij
dcUE

(8)
 subject to 
,=
1=
iij
n
i
jj Rrbc  (9)
Page 10 of 42
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
9
,=
1=
iDd ij
n
i
j  (10)
,=
1=
iij
n
i
jj pbW  (11)
where ij  is the number of shares consumer j  holds in firm i , and the last equation is the budget 
constraint. With normally distributed payoffs, the solution satisfies the pricing equation: 
 ,],[1][= iDRccov
rr
RE
p jij
i
i   (12)
With CARA preferences and a constant marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
damage, the pricing equation for consumer j becomes: 
],[
1
= 2 iD
r
p jiRijii   (13)
which can be inverted into a demand function for shares: 
.
1
][=
2 
iR
jiiij iDrp  (14)
Eq. (10) shows that a consumer with a stronger preference for responsibility (i.e. stronger aversion 
of social damage, implying a high j ) will hold less of the share if the firm is engaged with more social 
damage from its production. Furthermore, greater risk will lower the demand proportional to the risk 
aversion of investors. Then, define j
m
j
m   1=)(1/=  as the average rate of substitution between 
consumption and social damage of all consumers,  and without loss of generality we normalize the number 
of shares1 and consumers to one. In equilibrium the stock market value iM  of firm i  will be: 
].[
1
== 2 iD
r
pM
iRiii
  (15)
                                                          
1 The total number of shares is irrelevant as long as this number is constant. We can always redefine the price per 
share, in the end it is the total value of the firm that is relevant to the investor. A similar argument can be made for the 
number of consumers; aggregate consumption is relevant, not the consumption per capita.
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In our model, all the firm’s actions are perfectly observable and we do not restrict shortselling, but 
mechanically this result is related to the partial equilibrium models of Heinkel et al. (2001) and Mackey et 
al. (2007), and to Merton (1987) in the case of no shortselling. If shortselling is not allowed, the demand 
for shares cannot become negative. For firms with a lot of social damage related to their production (i.e. 
high iD ), Eq. (14) is a binding constraint. Then, screening for social damage (i.e. environmental, social or 
governance issues) takes place since some stocks are omitted from the portfolio. If shortselling is not 
allowed and we have a dichotomous distribution of consumers' preferences (consumers with either a high 
j  or with 0=j ), we get the model with screening of Heinkel et al. (2001). Similarly, we arrive at the 
Merton model of incomplete information if we interpret damage iD  as the “shadow cost of not knowing 
about security i ” (Merton, 1987, p.491). Both screening and asymmetric information lower the market 
value of polluting (less responsible) and “unknown” firms. Hence, we infer that socially responsible 
investors will require a lower financial return on their investment when the firms they invest in will try to 
internalize social damage associated with production. These investors value both financial returns and the 
mitigation of social damage. More demand for responsible stocks implies that their market return is below 
that on ordinary stock. Here, the main driver is that responsible investors are prepared to accept a lower 
financial return. Most studies after socially responsible investment take this perspective (for example 
Heinkel et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2005; Bello, 2005; Beltratti, 2005; Mackey et al., 2007). However, they 
appear to neglect the supply side of corporate social responsibility, i.e. corporate conduct, to which we turn 
next.
Supply: Corporate conduct
We define the market value of the firm as the market value of equity plus the book value, which is 
simply the capital stock, so the market value of the firm is equal to ii kM  . Using Eq. (2), Eq. (4)-(5), and 
Eq. (15), we find the value of the firm in equilibrium as: 
iiiiiiiiiiii kkfkfrkkfr
kM  )]()()([1= 22 
)].()()([
1
= 22 iiiiiiii kfkfkfr
  (16)
Without agency problems, taxes, and transaction costs, the value of the firm only depends on 
output and not on the financing structure (cf. Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The value of the firm is equal 
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to its output, )( ii kf , discounted by ikf
r
iii   )(1 2
. The discount factor includes not only the risk 
free rate, r, but also the usual risk premium, )(2 iii kf , which is the risk aversion times the volatility of 
cash flows, and a premium for social damage, i , which is equal to the average shadow cost of social 
damage times social damage per output. .
To keep the analysis simple, we focus on extreme cases only and consider two types of corporate 
behavior. The first type of behavior is taking into account the concerns of investors about the production of 
social damage, and we label this as socially responsible behavior. The second type of behavior is pure 
profit maximization without taking into account investor’s concerns about social damage. We call this 
irresponsible behavior. This distinction is in line with Heal’s (2005, 2008) definition of corporate social 
responsibility. 
A socially responsible firm (SR) sets its capital intensity SRk  such that 
SR
SRR
SRSR rkf  

21
=)( , (17)
in effect, maximizing market value as in Mackey et al. (2007), because it turns out that the socially optimal 
solution is attained by maximizing firm value, not by maximizing profits (See the Appendix A for a 
derivation). This result corresponds to the argument made by Michael Jensen: “value is created when a 
firm produces an output or set of outputs that are valued by its customers at more than the value of the 
inputs it consumes (as valued by their suppliers) in such production” (Jensen, 2002, p. 239). Naturally, an 
economy without frictions will optimally allocate resources when the firm maximizes its market value. 
An irresponsible firm (IR), maximizes pure profits and sets its capital intensity IRk  such that: 
21
=)(
IRR
IRIR rkf 
 , (18)
where 222 )(:= SRSRSRSRR kf  and 
222 )(:= IRIRIRIRR kf See Lemma 1 of the appendix for the derivation 
of these results. 
We see that the social damage due to production generates a distinction between value 
maximization and profit maximization. The difference between the two expressions is that the irresponsible 
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firm does not consider the shadow cost of the social damage IR per output. The irresponsible firm uses a 
cost of capital that is too low from a social viewpoint, i.e. it takes into account the risk-free rate plus a risk 
premium, but not the social damage premium. 
Note that the choice of being socially responsible or socially irresponsible is exogenous to our 
model. In our model, there is no economic mechanism that forces firms to be socially responsible (see also 
Heal, 2008). Incorporating the motivation for this choice explicitly is beyond the purpose of this paper, and 
potentially requires more complex modelling (see also Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). For example, if 
shareholders disagree with the policy of a firm, they can either sell the stocks (Exit) or try to influence firm 
policy at shareholder meetings (Voice), however for this latter option we would have to rely on voting 
theory, which makes the analysis unnecessarily complex. Besides these direct links between shareholders 
and corporate policy, there are various potential agency problems between shareholders and management 
of the firm that may occur, which we acknowledge, but do not model here either.
4. Propositions
We present three equilibrium results showing that for comparison purposes between socially 
responsible and irresponsible firms it matters what kind of financial performance measure is being used. 
We discuss the properties of three measures that are widely used in the empirical literature. These three are 
market-to-book (or Tobin's Q), return on assets (i.e. accounting profit ratios), and stock market returns. 
Proposition 1
Define the market-to-book ratio as total market value divided by installed capital, kkM )/(  . 
Then:  
 1.  the market-to-book ratio of a socially responsible firm is always larger than the market-to-book ratio 
of an irresponsible firm with the same degree of homogeneity, irrespective of the level of damage per 
output; 
2.  the market-to-book ratio of socially responsible firms is constant with respect to damage per output.
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Note that the result even holds if firm risk levels differ, since the market value is determined by the 
appropriate discount rate. A responsible firm is maximizing market value, so it will install capital until the 
unique optimal market-to-book value is obtained.
Proof of Proposition 1
First note that =
)(
)(
ii
iii
kf
kkf 
. Substituting Eq. (17) in Eq. (16) we find that the total market value 
of a socially responsible firm is equal to 1=  SRSRSR kkM , so the market-to-book ratio is equal to 
1=)/(  SRSRSR kkM  which does not depend on the level of social damage. Substituting Eq. (18) in Eq. 
(16), we find that the total market value of the irresponsible firm is equal to
SRSRSR
IR
IRIRIR kkMkf
r
kkM )/(=<)(1=)/( 11 


    . (19)
Proposition 2
Define the return on assets (ROA) ratio as profits divided by installed capital, k/ . To make a 
fair comparison, we need to adjust for risk levels, so we compare  two types of firms for which 
222 == 
IRRSRR
. Then:  
1. the ROA of a socially responsible firm is always larger than the ROA of an irresponsible firm with the 
same degree of homogeneity;  
2.  the ROA of irresponsible firms is constant with respect to damage per output i , but for socially 
responsible firms it is increasing in damage per output i .
Since, in general, there is a risk-return trade-off, we compare two firms with the same risk. 
Otherwise, a difference in ROA could simply be due to risk and not to social responsibility of the firm. The 
alternative would be to look at firms with the same expected return and to compare their risk. If each firm 
is assumed to have the same corporate goal, namely to maximize profits, then observing a higher ROA 
would indeed imply superior financial performance. However, socially responsible firms do not maximize 
profits and based on a simple comparison of ROA we would label irresponsible firms as inefficient. 
According to conventional microeconomic theory, relatively higher average profits should induce 
additional investments, since maximum profits have not yet been attained. With social damage, however, 
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socially responsible investors appreciate the internalization of this social damage. In their utility function, 
this alternative corporate goal compensates for pure profit maximization. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Again, note that =
)(
)(
ii
iii
kf
kkf 
. Using the definition of profits we have 
rkfkrkkkfkROA iiiiiiiii   )/(=/)/(=/= . Substituting for )( ii kf   using Eq. (1) we see that for the 
irresponsible firm 
r
r
ROA
IRR
IR 
 )(1
=
2 (20)
which does not depend on damage per output i . For socially responsible firms we substitute for )( ii kf 
and find that 
r
r
ROA
SR
SRR
SR 
 )(1
=
2  (21)
which is increasing in damage per output SR . Looking at the difference we see that 
0>
)(1)(1
=
22
IRRSRR
IRSR rrROAROA
SR  


 (22)
given that risk is identical 222 == 
IRRSRR
. 
Proposition 3
Define stock market returns as M/ . To make a fair comparison, we adjust for risk levels, so we
compare two types of firms for which 222 == 
IRRSRR
. Then:  
1.  whether the risk-adjusted stock market returns are higher for socially responsible firms or irresponsible 
firms is ambiguous; 
 2.  socially responsible firms have lower stock market returns compared to irresponsible firms with the 
same damage per output. 
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A set of firms that have the same social damage per output can be seen as an industry. As with 
ROA, otherwise a difference in stock market return could simply be due to risk and not to social 
responsibility of the firm. Therefore, we find that socially responsible firms have lower stock market 
returns compared to irresponsible firms that are in the same industry. If we compare socially responsible 
firms to irresponsible firms at an aggregate level, i.e. we do not correct for industry type, then it is 
ambiguous whether stock market returns are higher or lower for socially responsible firms. The intuition 
behind this proposition is that corporate social responsibility relates to the internalization of social damage 
of production, not just to the extent to which it creates social damage (Heal, 2008). Thus, for example, a 
more polluting industry has to compensate more for its pollution if it wants to be labeled socially 
responsible. Unless we identify what drives firms to engage in corporate social responsibility - e.g. 
polluting industries are relatively more involved in pursuing social responsibility - we are unable to make 
precise statements concerning the stock market return of socially responsible firms (see Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2010).
Proof of Proposition 3
First we observe that 
1
=
/
/
=/  BooktoMarket
ROA
kM
k
M
 . We look at firms for which risk 
levels are identical 222 == 
IRRSRR
. Using the expression for ROA and market-to-book, we can express 
the stock market returns of the socially responsible firm as 
,
)(1
=
SR
SR
SR
B
rA
M
SR




(23)
 and the stock market returns of the irresponsible firm as 
,=
IR
IR
IR
B
A
M 

 (24)
with  )(11= 2 rA  and ))(1(1= 2 B . Note that both are increasing in social damage per 
unit of output. A higher share of social responsible investors implies a higher  , which also increases 
stock returns. If risk aversion δ increases, investors also require a higher rate of return. When the output 
elasticity of capital   is higher it means that the marginal product of capital will be higher resulting in 
higher stock market returns.
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The sign of the difference of these two equations – (23) and (24) – depends on the combination of 
SR  and IR . Stock market returns of the irresponsible (IR) and responsible (SR) firm are identical if: 
.
)(11
)(11
=
2
IR
IRSR 



(25)
If SR exceeds the right-hand side of this equation, the socially responsible firm has a higher stock 
market return, otherwise it will be lower. We see that if IRSR  = , that is, if we compare within a single 
industry, stock market returns are lower for socially responsible firms. Ceteris paribus, socially responsible 
investors are willing to accept a lower rate of return on their investment. 
Thus, on the basis of our theoretical framework, we are able to assess the relationship between 
(indicators of) financial performance and social responsibility. From the demand side, that is the investors, 
social responsibility is to be associated with higher market-to-book ratios (higher market value in relation 
to the book value of the assets of the firm). This is because they are priced above conventional or 
irresponsible firms for whose stock there is less demand. From the supply side, we find that more 
responsible firms have a higher return on their assets. This is rooted in decreasing marginal returns to 
production. Combining the demand and supply side leads to an undetermined overall result regarding the 
profits per share of responsible vis-à-vis irresponsible firms. This is because both the market-to-book ratio 
and the return of assets of responsible firms are higher than those of irresponsible firms. Then, the overall 
impact of social responsibility on the profits per market value (stock), i.e. the ratio between the two, is 
ambiguous. As a result, the stock market return of responsible firms depends on the relative size of the 
demand and supply side effects. This ambiguity is driven by differences in social damage per output, which 
does not play much of a role when comparing ROA or market-to-book. However, for the same level of 
social damage per output, we find the conventional result that the socially responsible firms have a lower 
stock market return than the irresponsible firms.
In all, on the basis of this ‘general’ equilibrium framework, we predict that socially responsible 
firms have a higher market-to-book ratio than irresponsible firms. Furthermore, we predict they have a 
higher return on assets than irresponsible firms. However, the stock market return of responsible firms can 
be either higher or lower than that of irresponsible firms. 
In the next section of this paper, purely for illustrative reasons, we link the empirical evidence as 
analyzed in Margolis and Walsh (2001, 2003) to our three propositions.
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5. Illustration
Several studies find a positive association between social and financial performance. However, 
socially responsible investing does not seem to earn positive abnormal stock market returns (see section 2). 
We argue that different financial performance measures capture different economic effects. In this section, 
we relate our propositions to the findings in the empirical literature; in particular paying attention to what 
type of performance measure is being used. For this purpose, we consulted the widely cited surveys on the 
link between corporate social responsibility and corporate financial performance of Margolis and Walsh 
(2001, 2003). We classify the studies discussed in these reviews according to the financial performance 
measure used. We relate the empirical findings to our three propositions. Therefore, we will only look into 
studies that use market-to-book, return on assets, or stock market returns. As such, we examine more than 
60 studies. Table 1 provides a summary of the results.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Market-to-Book
Table 1 shows that all five studies that use the market-to-book ratio find a strong and positive 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and market-to-book (the details of the studies can be 
found in Appendix B. This is precisely what Proposition 1 predicts, namely that market-to-book is 
relatively lower for irresponsible firms. Heal (2005: 402) also derives this conclusion: “One robust result 
seems to be that superior environmental performance is correlated with high values for Tobin’s Q.”.
Return on Assets
Table 1 shows that 36 studies use return on assets or a comparable accounting profit measure. First 
note that not one study finds a negative relationship between social and financial performance. 
Furthermore, 17 out of the 18 studies that are classified as presenting either strong or moderate evidence 
find a positive relationship, which is in line with Proposition 2. Overall, 27 out of 36 studies find a positive 
relationship. The studies that are classified as presenting weak evidence find no relationship. Details about 
these 36 studies are in Appendix C.
There is additional evidence that supports Proposition 2. Spencer and Taylor (1987) note that the 
relationship is valid at the industry level. This indicates that differences in ROA are not solely due to 
differences in damaging technologies. This evidence is supported by Griffin and Mahon (1997), who look 
at a single industry and find a positive relationship between ROA and corporate social responsibility, and 
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also by Dooley and Lerner (1994), who use a firm’s ROA relative to the industry average ROA as an 
indicator and find the predicted positive relationship.
Stock market returns
Table 1 also shows that 27 studies investigate stock market returns as a financial performance 
measure. In Appendix D, we grouped these studies into comparative studies and event studies. For the 
comparative studies (panel A in Appendix D) the findings differ considerably and so at first sight these
studies indicate mixed effects (or no effect) on the relation between differences in social responsibility and 
stock market returns, which is in line with Proposition 3. Event studies (panel B in Appendix D) present a 
less conflicting picture. However, the problem with event studies is that it may be unclear whether or not 
the “event” is really providing new value-relevant information to investors (MacKinlay, 1997). If this is 
not the case, the event will not significantly affect the stock market return. In line with Proposition 3, most 
event studies find the expected negative relationship. However, three studies find a positive relationship, 
two of which are on the withdrawal of international firms from South-Africa in the 1980s.
In all, Table 1 clearly shows that the alleged paradoxical empirical findings are fully in line with 
the propositions of our theoretical framework of responsible investing. Therefore, these findings can be 
interpreted as strong evidence for a positive association between social responsibility and financial 
performance. Our investigation of the sixty studies provides results that are very well aligned with the 
predictions we made on the basis of our equilibrium framework. It appears that socially responsible firms 
have a higher market-to-book ratio than irresponsible firms. Furthermore, socially responsible firms have a 
higher return on assets than irresponsible firms. However, the stock market return of socially responsible 
firms can be either higher or lower than that of irresponsible firms.
6. Conclusion
A large number of studies investigate the connection between corporate social and financial 
performance and try to find out if firms do good by doing well. The general conclusion is that there is a 
positive association between the two. However, most empirical studies after socially responsible investing 
find no statistically significant impact of corporate social responsibility on stock market returns and hence 
cannot corroborate the findings on the basis of accounting data. There is widespread disagreement about 
how to interpret these seemingly conflicting observations. 
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We offer a coherent theoretical framework of responsible investing from which we can logically 
derive propositions about the relationship between social and financial performance. Key assumptions are 
that socially responsible investors value taking account of social damage associated with production. As a 
result, they accept a lower financial return on responsible stock compared to irresponsible stock. 
Furthermore, regarding the supply side of the economy, we assume that socially responsible entrepreneurs 
try to internalize the social damage of their production. This results in less input of capital and a higher 
return on assets. The implication from the demand side assumption is that responsible firms are 
characterized by higher market-to-book ratios than irresponsible firms. The implication from the supply 
side assumption is that more responsible firms are characterized by a higher return on assets. In the 
equilibrium situation, we arrive at an ambiguous result for the impact of social responsibility on stock 
market returns: It is not clear beforehand whether stock market returns are higher for responsible than for 
irresponsible firms. This ultimately depends upon the relative strength of how investors and firms 
respectively value the internalization of external effects. As a consequence, our framework is able to solve 
the paradox in the literature on social and financial performance.
We conclude that when firms announce social responsibility, this may lead to lower stock market 
returns, but not necessarily to lower firm value. From the investor perspective, social responsibility is to be 
associated with a higher market value in relation to the book value of the assets of the firm. This is because 
these assets are priced above conventional or irresponsible firms for whose stock there is less demand. 
From the corporate perspective, we show that more responsible firms have a higher return on their assets. 
Irresponsible firms refrain from incorporating the effect of social damage (i.e. effects that may results from 
environmental, social and governance issues) and use a cost of capital that is too low from a social 
viewpoint. Responsible entrepreneurs do account for social damage and end up with a higher cost of 
capital. Then, their investment of capital will be lower but given decreasing marginal returns, the reduction 
in revenues is smaller than the reduction in capital. Combining the demand and supply side leads to an 
undetermined overall result regarding the profits per share of responsible vis-à-vis irresponsible firms as 
both the market-to-book ratio and the return of assets of responsible firms are higher than those of 
irresponsible firms. The stock market return of responsible firms depends on the relative strength of the 
demand and supply side effects. This ambiguity is driven by differences in damage per output, which does 
not play much of a role when comparing ROA or market-to-book. Three issues are at stake: the relative 
amount of responsible investors, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and the output elasticity of 
capital. We derive that ceteris paribus a higher share of responsible investors among the investors increases 
stock market returns. This also is the case when the risk aversion of investors increases. Furthermore, stock 
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market returns are higher when the output elasticity of capital becomes higher at it implies that the 
marginal product of capital increases.
A limitation of our approach is that we do not explicitly model the choice of the firm with respect 
to being socially responsible or irresponsible. However, we derive that in equilibrium social responsibility 
does arise endogenously if firms choose to maximize their value. This works through the changes in the 
cost of capital due to firms’ preferences regarding social damage. Another limitations is that in achieving 
lower social damage in our setting, the firm simply changes its capital intensity, whereas in practice 
additional costs may have to be incurred. We could explicitly include another production factor, such as
clean capital or clean labor. In this case,  the total expenses of clean firms would also be higher given the 
same output, simply because the firms are choosing again allocations that are “inefficient” from a pure 
profits perspective. We speculate that the qualitative results would not change substantially in this case, 
though of course until such an alternative model is investigated one cannot say for sure. To us, this would 
be a natural extension of our model in future research.
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Table 1. 
Overview of empirical findings
positive relation negative relation mixed relation no relation
performance 
measure
total 
number 
of studies number % number % number % number %
market-to-book 5 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
accounting profit 36 27 (75%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9 (25%)
stock market-
returns 27 7 (26%) 9 (33%) 3 (11%) 8 (30%)
Total 68 39 (57%) 9 (13%) 3 (5%) 17 (25%)
Overview of the results of the studies on the relation between corporate social responsibility
and corporate financial performance, classified by financial performance measure.
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Appendix A
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Derivation of the pricing equation
Set up the Lagrangean: 
)()],([
1=1=1=
iij
n
i
jjij
n
i
iij
n
i
j
j pbWDRrbUE i   
where   is the Lagrange multiplier. Taking the derivative yields the first-order condition for a maximum: 
0=][][ ijdijc pDUERUE i  (A.1)
 Taking the derivative for jb  yields an expression for the Lagrange multiplier  : 
rUErUE jc
j
c ][=][= (A.2)
 since bonds pay with certainty. 
Consequently, we get the pricing equation: 
 iDUERUE
rUE
p jdi
j
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c
i ][][][
1
=  (A.3)
 Use ],[][][=][ yxcovyExExyE   to get: 
 iDUERUcovREUE
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p jdi
j
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j
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c
i ][],[][][][
1
=  (A.4)
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where the last result is obtained by noting that if two random variables x  and z  are jointly normally 
distributed, then ],[)]([=]),([ zxcovxgEzxgcov   due to a Lemma by Cochrane (2001, p. 164). 
Consequently, we obtain the pricing equation (8).
Lemma 1 With production externalities, maximizing the market value of the firm is different from 
maximizing profits. More specifically, if a firm maximizes its market value, it chooses ik  such that in 
equilibrium: 
.
)(1
=)(
2
iiii
ii kf
r
kf  
 (A.6)
In contrast, if a firm maximizes pure profits subject to the socially preferred fixed risk level, then it chooses 
ik  such that in equilibrium: 
.
)(1
=)(
2
iii
ii kf
r
kf 
 (A.7)
Proof:
Socially responsible behavior
We assumed a decomposable production function, so the effect of the state of nature is multiplicative. As a 
price taker, the firm recognizes that its value will change in proportion to output. In general, when the input 
level and market value equal ikˆ  and iMˆ , the firm calculates the market value given an alternative input 
level ik  as: 
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.)ˆˆ(
)ˆ(
)(
= iii
ii
ii
i kkM
kf
kf
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 The firm chooses its input level such that the derivative of the market value with respect to ik  equals zero, 
which at the equilibrium input level where ii kk =ˆ  yields: 
1.=)(
)(
)(
ii
ii
ii kM
kf
kf  (A.9)
 Substituting the expression for the market value of the firm Eq. (15) in Eq. (A.9) we see that in 
equilibrium: 
1=)]()()([
1
)(
)( 22
iiiiiiii
ii
ii kfkfkf
rkf
kf   (A.10)
which simplifies to 
.=])()[1( 2 rkfkf iiiiii   (A.11)
We see that the socially responsible firm takes into account the social damage it creates.
Socially irresponsible behavior
We consider a firm to be irresponsible if it does not take social damage related to production into account. 
So we define an irresponsible firm as a firm that maximizes pure profits (pay-offs to the shareholder). A 
pure profit maximizing firm faces the following problem: 
 =),(][max mii
ik
RcovtosubjectE (A.12)
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where mR  is the market return and   a fixed risk level. The restriction is on the covariance of profits with 
respect to market return, since the firm acknowledges that only systematic risk is priced. Rewrite, 
substitute, and set up the Lagrangean: 
))),(()(()(   miiiii Rgcovkfrkkf (A.13)
Here,   is the Lagrange multiplier. Maximizing with respect to ik  yields the following first-order 
condition: 
rRgcovkf mii =))),(()(1(  (A.14)
Covariances between the )(ig 's are assumed equal to zero, so that in equilibrium we have 
)(=))),(( 2 iii
m
i kfRgcov  . To find the equilibrium solution we directly substitute consumers' risk 
attitude   for the shadow cost of risk  : 
rkfkf iiii =)]()[1(
2 (A.15)
Rewrite and we obtain Eq. (A.7).
Q.E.D.
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Appendix B
Studies using market-to-book ratio
Authors Relationship Strength of result
Brown and Perry (1994)  Positive strong
Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000)  Positive strong
Fombrun and Shanley (1990)  Positive strong
King and Lenox (2001)  Positive strong
Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993)  Positive strong
Studies using market-to-book (Tobin’s Q) find a positive relation between 
corporate social responsibility and corporate financial performance.
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Appendix C
Studies using accounting profit ratios
Authors Relationship Strength of Result
Berman, Wicks, Kotha and Jones (1999) Positive Strong
Brown and Perry (1994) Positive Strong
Dooley and Lerner (1994) Positive Strong
Judge Jr. and Douglas (1998) Positive Strong
Preston and O’Bannon (1997) Positive Strong
Simerly (1994) Positive Strong
Waddock and Graves (1997) Positive Strong
Graves and Waddock (1994) Positive Moderate
Graves and Waddock (2000) Positive Moderate
Hart and Ahuja (1996) Positive Moderate
Heinze (1976) Positive Moderate
Herremans, Akathaporn and McInnes (1993) Positive Moderate
McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988) Positive Moderate
Russo and Fouts (1997) Positive Moderate
Spencer and Taylor (1987) Positive Moderate
Turban and Greening (1997) Positive Moderate
Abbott and Monsen (1979) Positive Weak
Anderson and Frankle (1979) Positive Weak
Bowman (1978) Positive Weak
Bragdon Jr. and Marlin (1972) Positive Weak
Griffin and Mahon (1997) Positive Weak
Marcus and Goodman (1986) Positive Weak
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Parket and Eilbirt (1975) Positive Weak
Appendix C – continued –
  
Pava and Krausz (1995) Positive Weak
Wokutch and Spencer (1987) Positive Weak
Preston (1978) Positive N/A
Greening (1995) Positive N/A
Johnson and Greening (1999) No Effect/Positive Moderate
Cochran and Wood (1984) No Effect/Mixed Weak
Patten (1991) No Effect Strong
Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985) No Effect Weak
Chen and Metcalf (1980) No Effect Weak
Freedman and Jaggi (1982) No Effect Weak
Ingram and Frazier (1983) No Effect Weak
O’Neill, Saunders and McCarthy (1989) No Effect Weak
Rockness, Schlachter and Rockness (1986) No Effect Weak
Studies using accounting profit ratios (i.e. return on assets, return on equity, return on 
investments, return on sales) find a positive relationship between corporate social responsibility 
and corporate financial performance.
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Appendix D
Studies using stock market returns
A) Average return studies
Authors Relationship Strength of result
Freedman and Stagliano (1991) Positive Strong/Moderate
McGuire et al. (1988) Positive Moderate
Ingram (1978) Positive Moderate
Brown (1998) Positive Moderate
Vance (1975) Negative Strong
Newgren, Rasher, LaRoe and Szabo (1985) Negative Moderate
Guerard Jr. (1997b) Mixed Moderate
Davidson III and Worrell (1992) Mixed Weak
Brown (1997) No effect/Positive Weak
Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) No effect Moderate
Alexander and Buchholz (1978) No effect Weak
Guerard Jr. (1997a) No effect N/A
Chen and Metcalf (1980) No effect Weak
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Appendix D – continued –
B) Event Studies
Authors Relationship Strength of result
Blacconiere and Northcut (1997) Negative Moderate
Blacconiere and Patten (19940 Negative Moderate
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) Negative Moderate
Shane and Spicer (1983) Negative Moderate
Stevens (1984) Negative Moderate
Posnikoff (1997) Negative** Moderate**
Belkaoui (1976) Negative Weak
Meznar, Nigh and Kwok (1994) Positive** Strong**
Wright and Ferris (1997) Positive** Moderate**
Boyle, Higgins and Rhee (1997) Positive Moderate
Diltz (1995) Mixed Weak
Freedman and Jaggi (1986) No effect Moderate
Patten (1990) No effect Weak
Pava and Krausz (1995) No effect Weak
Studies using stock market returns find an ambiguous relation between corporate social 
responsibility and corporate financial performance.
*Other than the usage of the researchers, the results are given the interpretation “negative”,
if news on increased social responsibility increases the stock price significantly in the event
window. In the context of our model, a correction of the stock price results in lower stock
market returns for these firms, given that operating profits are not affected by the news.
This way, our interpretation makes it possible to compare event studies with studies that
use average stock market returns.
**These are studies on the effect of announcing withdrawal from South-Africa, with conflicting
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results.
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Towards a Theory of Responsible Investing:
On the Economic Foundations of Corporate Social 
Responsibility
Highlights
 We develop a model that links socially responsible investing and 
corporate social responsibility.
 Responsible firms have higher market-to-book ratios and higher 
return on assets.
 The overall effect on stock market returns depends on the relative 
strength of demand and supply side effects.
 Our framework reconciles the contradictory findings from the 
empirical literature.
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Towards a Theory of Responsible Investing:
On the Economic Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility
Lammertjan Dama & Bert Scholtensa,b
ABSTRACT 
Studies that link corporate social and financial performance usually find a positive association 
between the two. However, the literature does not establish a significant impact of socially 
responsible investing on stock market returns. We develop a coherent economic framework of 
responsible investing to address this paradox. The framework offers theoretical underpinnings for 
all research on responsible investment as it provides the theoretical underpinnings for the actual 
behavior of market participants. We associate corporate social performance with key financial 
accounting ratios like the market-to-book ratio (market value of the firm in relation to accounting 
value), return on assets, and stock market return. We conclude that there is a strong theoretical 
foundation for a positive relationship between corporate social responsibility and financial 
performance, though the relation is conditional on which financial performance measure is 
considered. We illustrate that the empirical literature about responsible investing is well in line 
with our model’s propositions. 
a University of Groningen, Department of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, PO Box 
800, 9700 AV  Groningen, The Netherlands, phone +31-503637064, mail 
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